Introduction
Game theory has been used as a powerful analytical tool for decision making problems in the organizations or competitive systems. There are always uncertainty and imprecision existing in real-life decision making information. Therefore, taking into uncertainty and imprecision of information in decision making problems may be requested to construct mathematical models under fuzzy environments. Fuzzy game theory provides a way of solving real-life conflict problems with fuzzy information. Recently, an increasing number of papers and books [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] have been published on this topic in which several types of fuzzy games have been investigated. The fuzzy set (F-set) uses only a membership function, which assigns to each element x of the universe of discourse a number ( ) x μ from the unit interval [0, 1] to indicate the degree of belongingness to the F-set under consideration. The degree of non-belongingness is just automatically equal to 1 ( ) x μ − . However, a human being who expresses the degree of membership of a given element in a F-set very often does not express corresponding degree of non-membership as the compliment to 1. On the other hand, sometimes it seems to be more natural to describe imprecise and uncertain opinions not only by the degree of membership. It is due to the fact that in some situations players also describe their negative feelings, i.e., their degrees of dissatisfaction about the outcomes of the game. Furthermore, it is possible that players are not so sure about the outcomes of the game. In other words, players may have some degree of hesitation or uncertainty. Thus, Atanassov [16] [17] [18] introduced the concept of the conservative betting on sport game events by a fuzzy (partially rational) decision maker with the help of generalized lotteries of II type. The scheme accounted for the interval-valued character of probability elicitation results which were equivalently described by the IF-set in the mathematical expression. The fuzzy rational lottery with IF-set representation of the state uncertainty was proposed. Classical and conservative methods were proposed to transform the fuzzy rational lottery into ordinary lotteries, which were solved by the ordinary methods such as Wald's maximin principle and utility theory. Li and Nan 27 studied the matrix games in which payoffs of players are expressed with the IF-set and goals of players are not taken into consideration. The concepts of the solutions for matrix games with payoffs of IF-sets were defined and hereby a method was developed on the basis of a pair of auxiliary nonlinear/linear programming models, which were derived from the constructed bi-objective programming models. Li 28 further extended the method 27 to study the matrix games with payoffs of interval-valued IF-sets. The discussed matrix games 27, 28 only taken into consideration uncertainty in payoffs of players, which was expressed with IF-sets. In reality, however, players may have their expected goals for the outcome of the game. The goals may be given by players with some uncertainty. Namely, players may have IF-set goals which are expressed with IF-sets (please see the following Definition 2). Therefore, game with IF-set goals is an important type of games in game theory. However, there exists no investigation on games with IF-set goals. In this paper, we study matrix games with IF-set goals in which goals of players are expressed with IF-sets and payoffs of players are real numbers rather than IF-sets. It is not difficult to see that the matrix game with IF-set goals differs from the matrix game with F-set goals, which was studied by Sakawa and Nishizaki 12, 13 and Bector et al. 1, 2 The former uses the degree of membership and the degree of nonmembership to express players' goals while the latter only uses the degree of membership to express players' goals. Thus, the degree of hesitation of the IF-set goals may not be equal to 0 while the degree of hesitation of the F-set goals is always equal to 0. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The concept of an IF-set is briefly introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, matrix games with IF-set goals are formulated and the concept of their solutions is defined. It is proven that the solutions of matrix games with IFset goals can be obtained through solving the newly auxiliary linear programming models derived from a pair of bi-objective programming models. A numerical example and conclusion are given in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. , where every ij a ( 1, 2, , ;
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is a real number. The payoff matrix for player Ⅱ is ( ) ij m n a × − = − F since the matrix game is zero-sum. In reality, however, players may have their respective expected goals for the outcome of the game. Generally, players may give their goals according to their judgments and estimations. However, these judgments and estimations are uncertain and imprecise or vague. In order to accommodate uncertain and imprecise nature of human judgment and estimation, we employ the IF-set to describe each player' goal, i.e., assume that each player has an IF-set goal, which is defined as follows.
Definition 2. (IF-set goals) Denote the set of the
, where R is the set of real numbers.
Then, an IF-set goal 
x Fy , which satisfy the condition: An IF-set goal is characterized by a pair of membership and non-membership functions, which map a domain of payoffs into the range of the degree of satisfaction and the range of the degree of dissatisfaction of attainment for the IF-set goal, respectively. Assume that player I may prefer the payoff possessing the higher membership degree and the lower non-membership degree. Namely, player I wants to maximize the degree of satisfaction of attainment of the IF-set goal and minimize the degree of dissatisfaction of attainment of the IF-set goal. Whereas player II will choose a strategy so as to minimize player I's degree of satisfaction and maximize player I's degree of dissatisfaction of attainment of the IF-set goal. Thus, the concept of a maximin-minimax solution for matrix games with IF-set goals is given as follows. Obviously, the concept of the solution of matrix games with IF-set goals is different from that proposed by Sakawa and Nishizaki 12, 13 and Bector et al. 1, 2 in that the former has the additional non-membership function and hereby needs to optimize both the membership function and the non-membership function simultaneously. Moreover, the concept of the solution of matrix games with the IF-set goals is different from that proposed by Li and Nan 27 and Li 28 in that the latter took into consideration the IF-set payoffs rather than the IF-set goals.
In the sequent, optimization models are constructed for players I and II so as to obtain the maximin-minimax solutions of the matrix games with IF-set goals.
The membership function A μ and non-membership function A υ of the IF-set goal for player I may be of different forms according to the real situations and needs. Here, we choose the linear functions of membership and non-membership as follows: The following conclusion is easily reached from Eqs. (3) and (4), respectively. Then
Proof. It is easily derived from Eqs. (3) and (4) 
then it is easily seen from Eqs. (3) and (4) that
then it follows from Eqs. (3) and (4) 
Combining with Eqs. (5)- (8), we have:
. Summarizing the cases (a)-(c), we have proven that A is an IF-set. The following Theorems show that if IF-set goals are reduced to F-set goals for players then Eqs. (11) and (16) can be reduced to the models given by Bector et al 2 . (22) Using Eqs. (3) and (22) 
Theorem 4. If the degree of membership
The constraint condition in Eq. (26) may be written as follows: Theorems 4 and 5 show that the proposed models in this paper are the generalization of those given by Bector et al. 2 It is easily seen that using Eqs. (11) and (16), the least degrees of satisfaction of attainment of the IF-set goals and the largest degrees of dissatisfaction of attainment of the IF-set goals for players are obtained, as well as the degrees of hesitation of attainment of the IF-set goals for players. However, according to the models (i.e., Eqs. (21) and (30)) given by Bector et al. 2 , only the least degrees of satisfaction of attainment of the F-set goals are obtained and the degrees of dissatisfaction of attainment of the F-set goals are automatically equal to the compliments to 1, i.e., the degrees of hesitation of attainment of the F-set goals for players are always equal to zero.
An application to the market share problem
Suppose that there are two companies 1 C and 2
C
aiming to enhance the sales amount and market share of a product in a targeted market. 1 C has two pure strategies 1 δ and 2 δ . 2 C has three pure strategies 1 σ , 2 σ and 3 σ . Under these strategies, the payoff matrix F is given as follows:
The aspiration level and the corresponding tolerance error of 1 C are designated as If the expected goal of the company 1 C is expressed with the F-set rather than the IF-set, i.e., the company 1 C has a F-set goal, then according to Eq. (21), the linear programming model can be constructed as follows: . The least degree of satisfaction of attainment of the fuzzy goal for 2 C is 0.550 . By comparison analysis, it is not difficult to see that using the proposed models in this paper and the models (i.e., Eqs. (21) and (30)) given by Bector et al 2 , we can obtain the strategies and the least degrees of satisfaction of attainment of the IF-set (or F-set) goals for the companies 1 C and 2 C . However, using the proposed models in this paper, we can also obtain the largest degrees of dissatisfaction and the degrees of hesitation of attainment of the IF-set goals for the companies 1 C and 2 C , which are of importance for 1 C and 2 C . For example, using Eq. (43), the least degree of satisfaction of attainment of the F-set goal for 2 C is 0.550 , whereas the degree of dissatisfaction of attainment of the F-set goal for 2 C is automatically equal to 1 0.55 − , i.e., 0.45 according to the Definition of the F-set. In this case, intuitively the company 2 C may not be sure whether the strategy * T (0.25, 0, 0.75) = y is optimal or not in that the degree of satisfaction and the degree of dissatisfaction of attainment of the F-set goal are approximately equal, especially when they are both equal to 0.5 . However, using the proposed models in this paper, the largest degree of dissatisfaction of attainment of the IF-set goal for 2 C is only 0.063 , which may make 2 C believe that the strategy * reliable. The results show that the proposed models in this paper are reasonable and may provide more abundant information for players to make decision.
Conclusions
In this paper, we formulate the matrix games with IF-set goals and hereby develop the linear programming method, which is different from those proposed by Li and Nan 27 and Li 28 . On the one hand, the discussed matrix games are remarkably different. The matrix games discussed in this paper are ones in which uncertainty only appears in goals of players, i.e., the goals of players are expressed with the IF-sets whereas payoffs of players are real numbers rather than the IFsets. The matrix games discussed in Li and Nan 27 and Li 28 are ones in which uncertainty only appears in payoffs of players, i.e., the payoffs of players are expressed with the IF-sets whereas goals of players are not taken into consideration. On the other hand, the constructed bi-objective programming models and hereby the derived auxiliary non-linear/linear programming models are remarkably different. The main reason is that in this paper both the membership and non-membership functions of IF-set goals for players are optimized simultaneously whereas in Li and Nan 27 and Li 28 the expected payoff of player Ⅰ is optimized according to the inclusion relation on the IFsets 16, 17 . Moreover, the proposed models in this paper are a natural generalization of those developed by Bector et al 2 .
It is easily seen that the proposed models in this paper may provide more information than those 2 .
Namely, the proposed models in this paper provide not only the least degree of satisfaction of attainment of the IF-set goals but also the largest degree of dissatisfaction and the degree of hesitation of attainment of the IF-set goals. The results show that the IF-set may express information more abundant and flexible than the F-set when it is used to deal with uncertainty in game theory. Naturally, in many cases both goals and payoffs of players may be the IF-sets. Such a kind of matrix games will be investigated in the future.
